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To appreciate the contribution of Professors Dana Brakman Reiser and Steven A.
Dean in their pathbreaking volume on social enterprise law, we must begin by
recognizing what we are not discussing. As the authors declare: “social enterprises are not charities” (p. 165). By definition, social enterprises are businesses,
and thus not subject to the nondistribution constraint so familiar to nonprofit
scholars and practitioners. An impact investor seeks profit, perhaps limited
because of the social mission or to redirect to a new social enterprise. But the
dual motives open up the parties to the risk that their objectives will not align.
Brakman Reiser and Dean examine how the law can perform a supporting
function in developing trust between social enterprise entrepreneurs and potential investors (and among investors). Because investing for mission is a voluntary exchange in a situation of asymmetric information – sound familiar? – the
law can enable vehicles that enhance the reliability of signals and back up precommitment devices.
As a threshold matter, nonprofit organizations and those who study and
advise them could have an incomplete view of the role of law if they primarily
deal with law as a source of regulation and government oversight. Nonprofit
observers properly worry about the prescriptions and proscriptions of nonprofit
corporate and trust law, and of the requirements for tax exemption and charitable-contribution deductions. Enforcement of these laws largely is the responsibility of the state attorneys general and courts and of the Internal Revenue
Service, as befits a public-law portion of the legal landscape.
Often underappreciated by nonprofit scholars, though, is the positive role
played by private law – and by transactional lawyers. Consider the tax lawyer
who structures a real-estate joint venture between a nonprofit organization and
a limited partnership of private investors, or an estate planner who fashions a
restricted gift instrument or charitable bequest in a will for a wealthy client.
While these types of private ordering must take place within the larger regulatory framework – such as avoiding unrelated business taxable income or
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ensuring that the transaction qualifies as a completed gift1 – the generally
laissez-faire legal regime allows for a wide range of activities.
From the perspective of the business sector, we find that business lawyers,
legislators, and judges generally (although not exclusively) privilege a profit
motive and ultimate control by the equity owners. Moreover, because the “business judgment rule” is a key feature of board governance, courts will not
second-guess mere mistakes, untainted by fiduciary self-dealing or abdication
of the duty of care. Needless to say, the state attorney general lacks standing to
complain on shareholders’ behalf.
Now we arrive at our topic: Given that the law is largely organized around
organizational form, what happens when the participants seek both margin and
mission? Accustomed to a sectoral analysis of nonprofit activity, many legal
scholars and practitioners – as well as policy makers, regulators, and judges –
are left discomfited by the rise of social enterprise, hybrid organizations, and
double-bottom-line ventures.
Some state legislatures have enacted enabling statutes for specific types of
organizations – such as for Benefit Corporations or Low-Profit Limited Liability
Companies (L3Cs) – that allow social enterprise entrepreneurs to focus on both
mission and profit in carrying out their fiduciary duties. Separately, some legal
practitioners and academics have been formulating proposals to liberalize the
legal – particularly tax – regime that compartmentalizes commercial activities.
Besides the inability of a corporate taxpayer to zero out income through charitable contributions, specific barriers arise from the difficulty of raising patient
capital due to: (1) the ability of a nonprofit to borrow (and pay interest) but not
to issue stock (and pay dividends); (2) the ability of a charity but not other
nonprofits and taxable enterprises to attract tax-deductible charitable contributions; (3) the uncertain ability of private foundations to make grants to businesses; and (4) limitations on designing appropriate governance, investmentreturn, and compensation structures.
Brakman Resier and Dean’s book provides both a lucid description of the
history and current legal landscape for social enterprise and offers carefully
designed proposals for reform. Those who hold a negative view of the law – that
it means only the three “R”s of regulation, red tape, and roadblocks – will find
eye-opening the authors’ view of law as a positive force in facilitating the trust

1 See Simon, Dale, and Chisolm (2006), discussing federal tax law’s four-pronged role: The
support function (subsidy), the equity function (notably redistribution), the regulatory function
(constraints on managerial behavior), and the border-patrol function (that is, between charities
and both the business and public sectors). Of course, dense financial ties among the sectors
exist. See generally, Brody (2009).
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between social enterprise entrepreneurs and impact investors that will induce
them to pool their resources. The authors’ delightfully memorable names for
their innovative new vehicles – MPH, FLY paper, and SE(c)(3) – aptly suggest
the variety of ways in which the law can be helpful in promoting and backing up
this trust.
Chapter 1, “The Social Enterprise Trust Deficit,” starts from the extreme of
the business corporation. In terms of raising capital, Brakman Reiser and Dean
view the corporate form as “mak[ing] trust all but irrelevant” (p. 14) due to the
law’s power of declaring the rights of shareholders and the obligations of
management. Corporate law, however, cannot adequately remedy the betrayal
of a particular unhappy investor when management and the other shareholders
sell a social enterprise to an acquirer who will not continue the mission: “That
truly committed impact investor might take her windfall and plow it into another
double-bottom-line venture, but can never recapture what was lost” (p. 16).
Indeed, the typical legal remedy for breach is measured by quantifying the
harm in dollars, but “privileging profit over social good will often increase
profits and stock prices” (p. 21). The need to aggregate capital raises the fundamental challenge of heterogeneity: Shareholders might have different views
about how much to preserve a social enterprise’s mission.
Chapter 2, “Prioritizing Mission with a Mission-Protected Hybrid,” begins
with the statutory development of novel organizational forms. Brakman Reiser
and Dean characterize these efforts – which saw the rise of variously named
“benefit” corporations and L3Cs – as the “first-generation” legal response.
Chapter 3, “Evaluating the Current Menu of Legal Forms for Social Enterprise,”
describes these vehicles in detail, but concludes by reporting disappointing
numbers of such entities.
After all, chapter 2 explains: “If the [organizational] form offers no guidance
as to how to break a tie [between margin and mission], it will be impossible to
police these entities or their leaders” (p. 28). Thus Brakman Reiser and Dean
propose a second-generation vehicle, the Mission-Protected Hybrid (MPH),
which must, in the aggregate, prioritize social good over profit. The authors
urge that MPH legislation include disclosure requirements both to an oversight
agency and to shareholders, resulting in ongoing external and internal enforcement mechanisms to test compliance. However, Brakman Reiser and Dean
acknowledge the limitations of disclosure, due not only to optimistic selfreporting, but also to the challenges of designing reliable metrics (see Chapter
6, “The Promise of Metrics”).
In a nod to the struggles of state charity regulators, chapter 2 suggests that
the designated agency might leverage enforcement resources by delegating the
review of compliance to private certifying bodies. Turning to the question of
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remedy, the authors recount the cautionary tale that led to the development of
intermediate sanctions short of the “death penalty” of loss of federal tax
exemption for charities. These weaknesses of public oversight prompt
Brakman Reiser and Dean’s MPH legislative proposal to include ways to
“empower stakeholders to police each other” (p. 43) and for shareholders to
challenge fiduciaries. At the same time, the authors explain why resort to court
will unlikely be a reliable or even desirable route to resolving these types of
disputes. Accordingly, they turn to the “crucial third leg to the enforcement
stool” (p. 47): ensuring some degree of fidelity to mission on exit (discussed
further in chapter 7). They describe a process requiring supermajority shareholder approval for dissolution, and a procedure, akin to cy pres, to transfer a
specified percentage of the remaining assets to a charity to use for the social
mission of the dissolving MPH.
Chapter 4, “From Form to Finance,” considers a different tack: Instead of
relying on organizational form or indeed a new state or federal regime, a tailored
financial instrument could match impact investors with social entrepreneurs. As
Brakman Reiser and Dean describe, corporate finance law already allows for a full
spectrum of negotiated arrangements, ranging from plain vanilla common stock
to plain vanilla debt. Mission-focused investors and entrepreneurs could come to
terms over a variety of parameters, such as agreeing on deferred interest payments
or a conversion feature in which the debt becomes equity upon sale of the
enterprise. The authors propose such an instrument that they dub FLY (flexible
low-yield) paper: “Providing capital for a specified period at concessionary rates
coupled with terms designed to secure a social enterprise’s mission for that fixed
period of time could fully satisfy many investors’ aims. Social entrepreneurs
needing patient capital to bring their dual-mission visions to life could also
be satisfied with this kind of stable, though not perpetual, investor commitment”
(p. 82). That is, rather than red tape, use a sticky loan. Appropriately, the authors
compare FLY paper to program- and mission-related investments made by some
private foundations (pp. 88–89).
Of course, not every impact investor has the wherewithal and desire to
negotiate over the investment, just like not every donor wants to hammer out
a restricted gift instrument with a charity. Accordingly, chapter 5, “The Holy
Grail of Retail Investment,” proposes that a new federal tax regime (and IRS
policing) would allow electing small social enterprises to signal to small investors their social-mission commitment. Combining the acronym for the federal
securities regulator (the Securities and Exchange Commission) and the federal
tax classification for exempt charities (Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3)),
Brakman Reiser and Dean dub this type of social enterprise “SE(c)(3).” The
authors’ proposal embraces both a carrot and a stick: income-tax exclusion for
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the first $250,000 of income that furthers a charitable purpose (and certain other
benefits) (p. 115), but ordinary tax rates rather than capital gains rates for
investors who sell their stock (as well as on any dividends received) (p. 116).
Overall, they suggest, this classification might even be revenue-neutral to the
fisc: “Those increased taxes on SE(c)(3)s that de-emphasize mission in favor of
the financial gains of their owners cross-subsidize the lighter burden enjoyed by
more mission-focused enterprises” (p. 121).
For nonprofit organizations, an important corollary to the lack of owners is
the absence of a “market for corporate control.” (See Brody 1996.) As emphasized at the beginning of this book review, social enterprises are not nonprofits –
but the analogy between social mission and charitable purpose offers helpful
guidance for how the law should approach the keystone issue of what chapter 7
calls “Social Enterprise Exits.” Brakman Reiser and Dean explain that the
techniques covered in earlier chapters “harness the power of exit. An MPH can
draw down; FLY paper has a term; certifying entities and exchanges can decertify and delist. Even SE(c)(3) status typically terminates at a claimant’s dissolution” (p. 144).
The authors emphasize that the law can ensure that “[s]elling does not have
to be selling out” (p. 155). Ideally, as Brakman Reiser and Dean urge, social
entrepreneurs and investors would plan for exit at the outset of the enterprise or
investment in order to ensure that their desired mission continues in legally
enforceable ways upon dissolution or transfer to an acquirer. Either up-front or
in the terms of sale, provision could be made to retain certain employees or
apply specified terms of employment, to continue charitable activities, or to
make contributions – at a cost, it might be expected, in sale price, whose
proceeds the investors could redeploy to another social mission if they desire.
Of course, bankruptcy is another matter; when assets are insufficient to cover
liabilities, only restricted charitable assets are protected for their donated purpose (pp. 162–165; see Brody (2005)).
Brakman Reiser and Dean’s conclusion to the volume aptly sums up their
view that “the law poses no threat to social enterprise, but instead offers
private and public actors an array of tools to nurture its growth.” The
thoughtful and creative techniques and instruments they propose – along
with ample case studies – bring the possibilities of the law alive, in a way
useful to legal experts and accessible to those grounded in other disciplines.
Not only does social enterprise now have a cutting-edge legal guide, but also
Brakman Reiser and Dean have helpfully mapped out the intriguing legal
interstices between nonprofits and business for those scholars and practitioners who remain focused on a single sector but need to understand the
evolving pressures on it.
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